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Friedman, George: The Next 100 Years—a Forecast for
the 21st century, Doubleday, 2009.
Historians who predict events more than a year or two
ahead are on a very slippery slope. Most prediction tends
to be linear: going in a straight line from here to there. This
is why the popular press gets it wrong when they predict
economic trends or predict our next conflicts; they see things
continuing forever in economics (which is never so) and
alternately underestimate our enemies until we are hit—and
then overestimate their capability. Malcolm Gladwell's book,
Tipping Point, does much better with prediction because he
demonstrates the cyclical nature of events—which pile up
unnoticed until they are at a point that tips, and a change
swings in.
George Friedman seems to employ this methodology
as well. He heads Strategic Forecasts (a company that
forecasts political, social, and economic trends) and has
taken on a century-long forecast that I have found surprising
and fascinating.
He explains his methodology: "I have no crystal ball.
I do, however, have a method that has served me well,
imperfect though it might be, in understanding the past and
anticipating the future. Underneath the disorder of history,
my task is to try to see the order—and to anticipate what
events, trends, and technology that order will bring forth."
He knows that he will not get it all right, but expects his
grandchildren to look at his book and find it "not half bad."
Friedman's method requires a keen knowledge of past
history and an analytical grasp of what makes cultures tick.
His description of the United States, for example, is that we
are "headstrong, immature, and brilliant." We are like a giant
adolescent, tromping on the neighbors' gardens. But we also
have the goodheartedness of youth—and unlike many around
the world, do not maintain century-long grudges.
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Every prediction he has made arises organically out of
prior historic patterns. For example, any good 19th century
analyst could (and did) see that Germany, Russia, and the
United States would be the giants of the 20th century and
that conflict would arise. (Nobody noticed Japan, however,
until they shocked the world by trouncing the great Russian
Empire in the 1905 naval battle in the Pacific.)
The strength of this method rests in the reality that a
country has a certain continuity of behavior and values,
almost a DNA, in a way, that is shaped by its history,
geography, and cultural programming. For example, Russia
has a geography that has left it vulnerable to attack from all
directions, and its foreign policy has always reflected that
concern. Because of this reality, Russia's historic experience
has been that a tough central government that can dominate
both the country and its neighborhood is preferred by its
people to a weaker, more participative democracy. We can
see this reality in the number of Russians who profess to
miss Stalin—the devil they knew rather than the devils
(invasion or anarchy) they fear.
Looking at China the same way, Friedman sees that they
have had the same experience—authoritarian centralized
government produces prosperity whereas weak government
leads to fragmentation and anarchy. But Friedman also looks
at a growing differential in development between the coastal
and interior parts of the country. This differential is already
giving the Chinese government problems with internal
unrest—and there is no relief in sight. He does not mention
what 1 think is the largest impending problem in China,
which is increasing desertification. Rivers that once helped
feed China are drying up—and this alone could produce
major famine and plagues. For these reasons, China, for all
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol60/iss60/14
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of its recent development, will not displace the United States
as the world's superpower in this century.
India has the same internal contradiction: a flourishing
rapidly-developing sector, but an interior of villages
that remain feudal. Again, I feel that he misses the other
issue—shortage of water and the poisoning of ground water
with agricultural poisons that may well have an effect on
birthrate.
Freidman mentions the global experience of population
decline—a phenomenon that has finally reversed three
centuries of population explosion. For example, three
countries that played a large role in 20th century wars—
Japan, Germany, and Russia, are all losing populations at
an astonishing rate. This will inevitably play a role in their
future power to impose their will on their neighbors.
Friedman's take on the "war on terror" avoids the panicky
view of those who see Militant Islam as more powerful than
it is. Militant Islam is no different than all of the terrorist
groups that assassinated and frightened Europe in the 19th
century. These terrorists have nothing to offer, and they
eventually lose the support of people they need. This is
already happening because Nihilism never has a following
for long.
But in looking at the next 100 years, Friedman does see
a continuing conflict that arises out of the fear of traditional
societies over what they see as overwhelming technological
and social changes affecting their world. The emancipation
of women particularly frightens and angers those whose
societies have been timelessly patriarchal. They will continue
to fight these social changes, but will ultimately lose.
But new players will emerge to challenge our status as
the single superpower—players who will form coalitions
and take us on: Japan and Turkey, as an Asian coalition (he
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2009
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makes a surprisingly good case for this) and a new coalition
that will take on the Russians, formed by Poland and an
Eastern European bloc (that we will support). Fascinating
stuff!
He predicts amazing technological breakthroughs as a
result of space war (already in development) that will spin off
as civilian technologies that will benefit us all. Yes, warfare is
not just a dead issue, but is somehow ever with us—although
no longer as deadly to civilians as 20th century war. Silicon
Valley should read this with interest—as should we all.
The only prediction that he makes that does not convince
me is that our final challenger in the 21st century will be
Mexico. He bases this prediction on several things: first,
a reminder that until the 1840s, Mexico appeared to be by
far the dominant country in North America-and a desire to
retain that role has never completely gone away. Second,
he notes that the Mexican/American borderland is very
different for Mexicans than for those living elsewhere in
the United States where they have integrated well. Unlike
other immigration situations experienced by the United
States, the Mexican immigrants in the border regions have
not integrated well; they go back and forth and may well, as
they are approaching majorities, try to join Mexico or declare
these areas independent (shades of Texas history).
I cannot conceive that a country as ill run as Mexico
has always been could suddenly blossom into a powerful,
technological superpower. It will take more than a century
of development to get rid of the feudal underpinnings of
much of Mexico. And even if it did, the migration of peasant
workers to the United States would ultimately dry up as
Mexico industrializes. I already see Mexican labor returning
to Mexico from border regions—and I see those who stay
becoming very American in culture.
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With the exception of this final prediction, I find the rest
of the book to be a very wise blueprint of what we may expect
during the rest of this century. The methology and predictions
make complete sense to me. Unintended consequences, he
says, are what this book is all about.
"If human beings can simply decide on what they want
to do and then do it, then forecasting is impossible. Free will
is beyond forecasting. But what is most interesting about
humans is how unfree they are. It is possible for people
today to have ten children, but hardly anyone does. We are
deeply constrained in what we do by the time and place in
which we live. And those actions we do take are filled with
consequences we didn't intend. When NASA engineers used
a microchip to build an onboard computer on a spacecraft,
they did not intend to create the iPod." Indeed they didn't.
Surprise is what makes predictions so much fun.
Laina Farhat-Holzman
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